Authenticated SSRF via globally routable address misclassification
Published Sep 9, 2026 · Updated Sep 10, 2026
SSRF in Open WebUI before 0.11.1 allows remote authenticated users to read reserved-address responses through server-side web fetches. The shared address screen in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py treats Python's globally routable classification as proof that a destination is external. Exploitation requires a verified account and default address screening; Azure-hosted deployments expose the platform channel, while demonstrated impact is limited to reachability and response read-back.
Summary
What happened
SSRF in Open WebUI before 0.11.1 allows remote authenticated users to read reserved-address responses through server-side web fetches. The shared address screen in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py treats Python's globally routable classification as proof that a destination is external. Exploitation requires a verified account and default address screening; Azure-hosted deployments expose the platform channel, while demonstrated impact is limited to reachability and response read-back.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2026-87999
- Published
- Sep 9, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 10, 2026
- Vendor
- Open WebUI
- Product
- Open WebUI
- Classifications
- CWE-918, T1190
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- authenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Sep 9, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Sep 10, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=< 0.11.1
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Reserved-address web-fetch proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
Labels summarize the accepted research assessment. They do not indicate a test against your environment.
Technologies
Your stack
See the directory against your own environment.
Your stack
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