Internal response disclosure via IPv6 SSRF bypass
Published Aug 18, 2026 · Updated Aug 19, 2026
Server-side request forgery in SiYuan before 3.7.4 lets attackers read internal HTTP responses through the application's proxy endpoints. The isPrivateIP check in kernel/util/net.go relies on Go address classifiers that do not treat NAT64, 6to4, and Teredo transition prefixes as private, so SSRFSafeDialer accepts hostnames that resolve to embedded private or metadata IPv4 targets. When SafeMode is enabled and the forward, WebSocket, SSE, or plugin proxy paths are reachable, the flaw becomes a full-read SSRF that can expose cloud instance credentials, internal services, and network topology.
Summary
What happened
Server-side request forgery in SiYuan before 3.7.4 lets attackers read internal HTTP responses through the application's proxy endpoints. The isPrivateIP check in kernel/util/net.go relies on Go address classifiers that do not treat NAT64, 6to4, and Teredo transition prefixes as private, so SSRFSafeDialer accepts hostnames that resolve to embedded private or metadata IPv4 targets. When SafeMode is enabled and the forward, WebSocket, SSE, or plugin proxy paths are reachable, the flaw becomes a full-read SSRF that can expose cloud instance credentials, internal services, and network topology.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2026-74905
- Published
- Aug 18, 2026
- Updated
- Aug 19, 2026
- Vendor
- SiYuan Note
- Product
- SiYuan
- Classifications
- CWE-918, T1190
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- Unavailable
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Aug 18, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 19, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=0 <3.7.4
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- GHSA proof of concept for IPv6 transition SSRF bypassproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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