HTTPS decryption via embedded private TLS key
Published Apr 4, 2026 · Updated Apr 4, 2026
Hard-coded key use in Tenda 4G03 Pro 1.0, 1.0re, 01.bin, and 04.03.01.53 allows remote attackers to decrypt HTTPS traffic. The firmware stores the same unencrypted ECDSA P-256 private TLS key in /etc/www/pem/server.key and distributes it in the public firmware image. Network access to the HTTPS service is sufficient for unauthenticated interception or device impersonation; no integrity or availability impact is reported.
Summary
What happened
Hard-coded key use in Tenda 4G03 Pro 1.0, 1.0re, 01.bin, and 04.03.01.53 allows remote attackers to decrypt HTTPS traffic. The firmware stores the same unencrypted ECDSA P-256 private TLS key in /etc/www/pem/server.key and distributes it in the public firmware image. Network access to the HTTPS service is sufficient for unauthenticated interception or device impersonation; no integrity or availability impact is reported.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2026-5527
- Published
- Apr 4, 2026
- Updated
- Apr 4, 2026
- Vendor
- Shenzhen Tenda Technology Co., Ltd.
- Product
- 4G03 Pro
- Classifications
- CWE-320, CWE-321, T1557
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Apr 4, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Apr 4, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
Compare your product and version with the public record. A matching version still requires validation against your environment.
Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=01.bin
- Affected versionversion=04.03.01.53
- Affected versionversion=1.0
- Affected versionversion=1.0re
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Shared ECDSA private-key proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
Labels summarize the accepted research assessment. They do not indicate a test against your environment.
Technologies
Your stack
See the directory against your own environment.
Your stack
Check the software in your environment
Book a demo to see how Hinoki identifies affected software and validates exploitability in your environment.
Book a demo