Operator impersonation via trusted-proxy header forgery
Published Jun 12, 2026 · Updated Jun 12, 2026
Authentication bypass in OpenClaw before 2026.5.18 allows local users to assume an operator identity through forged proxy headers. The Gateway's trusted-proxy path accepts identity headers from same-host callers that reach the proxy-facing port instead of requiring the designated proxy to supply them. The feature must be enabled and reachable from a lower-trust local process; resulting operator authority depends on configured permissions and tools.
Summary
What happened
Authentication bypass in OpenClaw before 2026.5.18 allows local users to assume an operator identity through forged proxy headers. The Gateway's trusted-proxy path accepts identity headers from same-host callers that reach the proxy-facing port instead of requiring the designated proxy to supply them. The feature must be enabled and reachable from a lower-trust local process; resulting operator authority depends on configured permissions and tools.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2026-53832
- Published
- Jun 12, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 12, 2026
- Vendor
- OpenClaw Foundation
- Product
- OpenClaw
- Classifications
- CWE-290
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Jun 12, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Jun 12, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=0 <2026.5.18
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Trusted-proxy loopback identity-header forgery proof of conceptfunctional · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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