Authentication-flow corruption via cross-principal state reuse
Published Jun 10, 2026 · Updated Jun 10, 2026
Authentication-state confusion in Eugeny russh 0.34.0-beta.1 through 0.60.3 allows remote attackers to alter later login flows. The server-side AuthRequest in russh/src/auth.rs remains connection-scoped and retains allowed methods, partial-success status, and in-progress method state after the user or service changes. Normal pre-authentication SSH requests can therefore make one principal's state affect another principal's responses, although no authentication bypass was demonstrated.
Summary
What happened
Authentication-state confusion in Eugeny russh 0.34.0-beta.1 through 0.60.3 allows remote attackers to alter later login flows. The server-side AuthRequest in russh/src/auth.rs remains connection-scoped and retains allowed methods, partial-success status, and in-progress method state after the user or service changes. Normal pre-authentication SSH requests can therefore make one principal's state affect another principal's responses, although no authentication bypass was demonstrated.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2026-46705
- Published
- Jun 10, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 10, 2026
- Vendor
- Russh Project
- Product
- russh
- Classifications
- CWE-287, T1190
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Jun 10, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Jun 10, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
Compare your product and version with the public record. A matching version still requires validation against your environment.
Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=>= 0.34.0-beta.1, < 0.61.0
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Public exploit references
- Cross-principal remaining-methods reuse PoCproof of concept · demonstrated
Labels summarize the accepted research assessment. They do not indicate a test against your environment.
Technologies
Your stack
See the directory against your own environment.
Your stack
Check the software in your environment
Book a demo to see how Hinoki identifies affected software and validates exploitability in your environment.
Book a demo