Signature-verification bypass via swallowed empty-certificate panic
Published May 15, 2026 · Updated May 15, 2026
Signature verification bypass in Sigstore Gitsign 0.4.0 through 0.14.0 allows remote attackers to pass malformed commits via exit status. CertVerifier.Verify indexes the first certificate without checking that GetCertificates returned one, and Streams.Wrap recovers the resulting panic as a nil error. Exploitation requires a certificate-free CMS/PKCS7 signature and a user or CI job that invokes verification and trusts only the process exit code; Git's GOODSIG check blocks that path.
Summary
What happened
Signature verification bypass in Sigstore Gitsign 0.4.0 through 0.14.0 allows remote attackers to pass malformed commits via exit status. CertVerifier.Verify indexes the first certificate without checking that GetCertificates returned one, and Streams.Wrap recovers the resulting panic as a nil error. Exploitation requires a certificate-free CMS/PKCS7 signature and a user or CI job that invokes verification and trusts only the process exit code; Git's GOODSIG check blocks that path.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2026-44310
- Published
- May 15, 2026
- Updated
- May 15, 2026
- Vendor
- Sigstore
- Product
- Gitsign
- Classifications
- CWE-129, CWE-390, T1553.002
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- May 15, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- May 15, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=>= 0.4.0, < 0.15.0
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Certificate-free PKCS7 signature proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
Labels summarize the accepted research assessment. They do not indicate a test against your environment.
Technologies
Your stack
See the directory against your own environment.
Your stack
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