Host object access via unwrapped Promise fulfillment
Published May 13, 2026 · Updated May 13, 2026
Sandbox boundary bypass in Patrik Simek vm2 before 3.11.0 allows attackers to read and mutate host objects through resolved Promises. The setup-sandbox.js fulfillment wrapper passes values through ensureThis(), which returns the original object when bridge.js finds no prototype mapping. Exploitation requires exposure of a host Promise resolving to a host object to sandboxed code, granting direct access only to reachable object state.
Summary
What happened
Sandbox boundary bypass in Patrik Simek vm2 before 3.11.0 allows attackers to read and mutate host objects through resolved Promises. The setup-sandbox.js fulfillment wrapper passes values through ensureThis(), which returns the original object when bridge.js finds no prototype mapping. Exploitation requires exposure of a host Promise resolving to a host object to sandboxed code, granting direct access only to reachable object state.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2026-44000
- Published
- May 13, 2026
- Updated
- May 13, 2026
- Vendor
- Patrik Simek
- Product
- vm2
- Classifications
- CWE-693, T1059.007
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- May 13, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- May 13, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=< 3.11.0
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- GHSA-mpf8-4hx2-7cjg host-object identity proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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