Code execution via unterminated TAR header fields
Published Jun 1, 2026 · Updated Jun 1, 2026
Stack-based buffer overflow in rxi microtar 0.1.0 and earlier allows attackers to corrupt stack memory via a crafted TAR archive. The raw_to_header() function passes fixed-width name and linkname fields to strcpy() without ensuring null termination, so copying continues beyond each 100-byte destination. The victim application must parse the archive; the demonstrated consequence is a crash, while controlled stack corruption enables code execution.
Summary
What happened
Stack-based buffer overflow in rxi microtar 0.1.0 and earlier allows attackers to corrupt stack memory via a crafted TAR archive. The raw_to_header() function passes fixed-width name and linkname fields to strcpy() without ensuring null termination, so copying continues beyond each 100-byte destination. The victim application must parse the archive; the demonstrated consequence is a crash, while controlled stack corruption enables code execution.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2026-43623
- Published
- Jun 1, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 1, 2026
- Vendor
- rxi
- Product
- microtar
- Classifications
- CWE-121, T1203
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Jun 1, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Jun 1, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
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- Affected versionversion=0 <=0.1.0
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- raw_to_header non-null-terminated name-field proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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