Root shell access via hardcoded Telnet credentials
Published May 4, 2026 · Updated May 4, 2026
Hardcoded credentials in D-Link DIR-600L Firmware B1 allow remote attackers to obtain a root shell through the LAN-facing Telnet service. /bin/telnetd.sh unconditionally starts telnetd at boot with a fixed username and a password read from /etc/alpha_config/image_sign, and the login binary compares the supplied values with strcmp(). LAN or Wi-Fi adjacency is sufficient; successful login exposes complete router configuration and arbitrary command execution as root.
Summary
What happened
Hardcoded credentials in D-Link DIR-600L Firmware B1 allow remote attackers to obtain a root shell through the LAN-facing Telnet service. /bin/telnetd.sh unconditionally starts telnetd at boot with a fixed username and a password read from /etc/alpha_config/image_sign, and the login binary compares the supplied values with strcmp(). LAN or Wi-Fi adjacency is sufficient; successful login exposes complete router configuration and arbitrary command execution as root.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2026-42374
- Published
- May 4, 2026
- Updated
- May 4, 2026
- Vendor
- D-Link
- Product
- DIR-600L Firmware
- Classifications
- CWE-798, T1078.001
- Attack vector
- adjacent
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- May 4, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- May 4, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
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- Affected versionversion=B1
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
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Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Public exploit references
- Securin Telnet backdoor proof of conceptfunctional · validated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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