Request smuggling via unchecked HTTP/3 body length
Published Apr 13, 2026 · Updated Apr 13, 2026
HTTP request smuggling in HAProxy 2.6 through 3.3.5 allows remote attackers to desynchronize backend requests via HTTP/3. The standalone-FIN path calls qcs_http_handle_standalone_fin() without first invoking h3_check_body_size(), so a zero-length FIN can end a body whose Content-Length promises more bytes. A public demonstration requires a QUIC-enabled build, an HTTP/3 frontend, the non-default http-reuse always setting, and a backend that responds early and drains the missing body, causing another user's request to be consumed as body data.
Summary
What happened
HTTP request smuggling in HAProxy 2.6 through 3.3.5 allows remote attackers to desynchronize backend requests via HTTP/3. The standalone-FIN path calls qcs_http_handle_standalone_fin() without first invoking h3_check_body_size(), so a zero-length FIN can end a body whose Content-Length promises more bytes. A public demonstration requires a QUIC-enabled build, an HTTP/3 frontend, the non-default http-reuse always setting, and a backend that responds early and drains the missing body, causing another user's request to be consumed as body data.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2026-33555
- Published
- Apr 13, 2026
- Updated
- Apr 13, 2026
- Vendor
- HAProxy Technologies
- Product
- HAProxy
- Classifications
- CWE-130, T1190
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Apr 13, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Apr 13, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=2.6 <3.3.6
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- HTTP Request Smuggling via HAProxy H3/QUIC Standalone FIN Body Validation Bypassproof of concept · demonstrated
Labels summarize the accepted research assessment. They do not indicate a test against your environment.
Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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