Physical LUKS key theft via permissive TPM policy
Published Mar 18, 2026 · Updated Mar 18, 2026
TPM policy weakness in Linux Containers IncusOS before 202603142010 allows physically proximate attackers to read and alter encrypted data. The default systemd-cryptenroll policy releases the LUKS volume key after the initrd, while GPT-based root selection accepts an attacker-controlled partition. With a powered-off system in hand, an attacker can substitute a root partition, boot a systemd unit under intact Secure Boot measurements, extract the real disk key, and access or modify the original root volume without owner interaction.
Summary
What happened
TPM policy weakness in Linux Containers IncusOS before 202603142010 allows physically proximate attackers to read and alter encrypted data. The default systemd-cryptenroll policy releases the LUKS volume key after the initrd, while GPT-based root selection accepts an attacker-controlled partition. With a powered-off system in hand, an attacker can substitute a root partition, boot a systemd unit under intact Secure Boot measurements, extract the real disk key, and access or modify the original root volume without owner interaction.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2026-32606
- Published
- Mar 18, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 18, 2026
- Vendor
- Linux Containers
- Product
- IncusOS
- Classifications
- CWE-522, T1005
- Attack vector
- physical
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Mar 18, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Mar 18, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=< 202603142010
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Public exploit references
- Bypassing disk encryption on systems with automatic TPM2 unlockproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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