Device-secret disclosure via unauthenticated UART output
Published Apr 6, 2026 · Updated Apr 6, 2026
Information disclosure in AZIOT 1 Node Smart Switch firmware 1.1.9 allows physically proximate attackers to read device secrets via UART. The exposed TX2 serial output emits excessive logs, while unencrypted firmware and storage can be dumped and searched for Wi-Fi credentials. Opening the device and wiring its UART or flash pins is required; the demonstrated extraction reveals the configured SSID and pre-shared key without authentication.
Summary
What happened
Information disclosure in AZIOT 1 Node Smart Switch firmware 1.1.9 allows physically proximate attackers to read device secrets via UART. The exposed TX2 serial output emits excessive logs, while unencrypted firmware and storage can be dumped and searched for Wi-Fi credentials. Opening the device and wiring its UART or flash pins is required; the demonstrated extraction reveals the configured SSID and pre-shared key without authentication.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2026-30613
- Published
- Apr 6, 2026
- Updated
- Apr 6, 2026
- Vendor
- Unknown vendor
- Product
- Unknown product
- Classifications
- CWE-200, T1552.001
- Attack vector
- physical
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Apr 6, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Apr 6, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
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What is affected?
Affected products and versions are unavailable in this record.
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- UART and firmware extraction methodologyfunctional · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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