Arbitrary file read via uncontained build paths
Published Jan 26, 2026 · Updated Jan 26, 2026
Path traversal in BentoML before 1.4.34 allows context-dependent attackers to read arbitrary host files through a malicious bentofile. The resolve_user_filepath function expands user-controlled paths and returns their real locations without enforcing containment in the build context. A victim must run bentoml build on the attacker-controlled configuration; selected files are copied into the bento archive and exposed when that archive is shared or deployed.
Summary
What happened
Path traversal in BentoML before 1.4.34 allows context-dependent attackers to read arbitrary host files through a malicious bentofile. The resolve_user_filepath function expands user-controlled paths and returns their real locations without enforcing containment in the build context. A victim must run bentoml build on the attacker-controlled configuration; selected files are copied into the bento archive and exposed when that archive is shared or deployed.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2026-24123
- Published
- Jan 26, 2026
- Updated
- Jan 26, 2026
- Vendor
- BentoML
- Product
- BentoML
- Classifications
- CWE-22, T1005, T1204.002
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Jan 26, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Jan 26, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=< 1.4.34
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Malicious bentofile.yaml file-read proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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