Code execution via unchecked TFSMLayer deserialization
Published Apr 13, 2026 · Updated Apr 13, 2026
Untrusted deserialization in Keras before 3.13.2 allows remote attackers to execute code by supplying a crafted .keras model. TFSMLayer.from_config accepts the serialized filepath and instantiates a layer that loads executable graph code from the external SavedModel without honoring safe mode. Execution requires a recipient to load the crafted model and occurs during inference with the privileges of the loading process.
Summary
What happened
Untrusted deserialization in Keras before 3.13.2 allows remote attackers to execute code by supplying a crafted .keras model. TFSMLayer.from_config accepts the serialized filepath and instantiates a layer that loads executable graph code from the external SavedModel without honoring safe mode. Execution requires a recipient to load the crafted model and occurs during inference with the privileges of the loading process.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2026-1462
- Published
- Apr 13, 2026
- Updated
- Apr 13, 2026
- Vendor
- Keras
- Product
- Keras
- Classifications
- CWE-502, T1204.002
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Apr 13, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Apr 13, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=unspecified <3.13.2
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Public exploit references
- huntr TFSMLayer safe-mode bypass proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
Labels summarize the accepted research assessment. They do not indicate a test against your environment.
Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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