Unpaid order completion via unsigned Inespay callback
Published Aug 6, 2026 · Updated Aug 6, 2026
Payment forgery in Jose Conti Payment Gateway for Redsys & WooCommerce Lite before 7.0.2 allows remote attackers to complete unpaid orders. The Inespay handle_callback() path trusts caller-supplied singlePayinId and OK status values, then marks the matching order paid without verifying a signature or amount. Exploitation requires Inespay to be enabled and a matching order identifier; an unauthenticated POST changes that order from pending to paid and completed.
Summary
What happened
Payment forgery in Jose Conti Payment Gateway for Redsys & WooCommerce Lite before 7.0.2 allows remote attackers to complete unpaid orders. The Inespay handle_callback() path trusts caller-supplied singlePayinId and OK status values, then marks the matching order paid without verifying a signature or amount. Exploitation requires Inespay to be enabled and a matching order identifier; an unauthenticated POST changes that order from pending to paid and completed.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2026-12584
- Published
- Aug 6, 2026
- Updated
- Aug 6, 2026
- Vendor
- Jose Conti
- Product
- Payment Gateway for Redsys & WooCommerce Lite
- Classifications
- T1565.002
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Aug 6, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 6, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=0 <7.0.2
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- WPScan forged Inespay callback proof of conceptfunctional · validated
Labels summarize the accepted research assessment. They do not indicate a test against your environment.
Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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