Routing daemon crash via unchecked prefix length
Published May 30, 2026 · Updated May 30, 2026
Stack-based buffer overflow in Shibby Tomato 1.28 and earlier allows local users to crash ripd through a crafted zserv frame. In rip_zebra_read_ipv4, an unchecked one-byte prefix length controls a stack copy whose destination has only about eight safe bytes, overwriting saved registers and the return address. The validated socket is root-owned with mode 0700, so demonstrated exploitation requires local administrative access and interrupts only the RIP routing daemon.
Summary
What happened
Stack-based buffer overflow in Shibby Tomato 1.28 and earlier allows local users to crash ripd through a crafted zserv frame. In rip_zebra_read_ipv4, an unchecked one-byte prefix length controls a stack copy whose destination has only about eight safe bytes, overwriting saved registers and the return address. The validated socket is root-owned with mode 0700, so demonstrated exploitation requires local administrative access and interrupts only the RIP routing daemon.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2026-10124
- Published
- May 30, 2026
- Updated
- May 30, 2026
- Vendor
- Shibby
- Product
- Tomato
- Classifications
- CWE-119, CWE-121, T1499.004
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- admin
Timeline
How it unfolded
- May 30, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- May 30, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=1.0
- Affected versionversion=1.1
- Affected versionversion=1.10
- Affected versionversion=1.11
- Affected versionversion=1.12
- Affected versionversion=1.13
- Affected versionversion=1.14
- Affected versionversion=1.15
- Affected versionversion=1.16
- Affected versionversion=1.17
- Affected versionversion=1.18
- Affected versionversion=1.19
- Affected versionversion=1.2
- Affected versionversion=1.20
- Affected versionversion=1.21
- Affected versionversion=1.22
- Affected versionversion=1.23
- Affected versionversion=1.24
- Affected versionversion=1.25
- Affected versionversion=1.26
- Affected versionversion=1.27
- Affected versionversion=1.28
- Affected versionversion=1.3
- Affected versionversion=1.4
- Affected versionversion=1.5
- Affected versionversion=1.6
- Affected versionversion=1.7
- Affected versionversion=1.8
- Affected versionversion=1.9
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Tomato ripd fake-zserv crash reproducerfunctional · demonstrated
Labels summarize the accepted research assessment. They do not indicate a test against your environment.
Technologies
Your stack
See the directory against your own environment.
Your stack
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