Privileged SMC access via unauthenticated XPC connections
Published Sep 2, 2025 · Updated Sep 2, 2025
Missing authentication in batteryKid 2.0 through 2.1 allows local users to perform privileged SMC operations through its XPC helper. The NSXPCListener delegate in PrivilegeHelper.swift accepts every incoming connection without validating the client, exposing helper methods that read and write SMC keys. Any local low-privileged process can reach the root-privileged helper after installation, enabling unauthorized hardware-control operations with system-wide consequences.
Summary
What happened
Missing authentication in batteryKid 2.0 through 2.1 allows local users to perform privileged SMC operations through its XPC helper. The NSXPCListener delegate in PrivilegeHelper.swift accepts every incoming connection without validating the client, exposing helper methods that read and write SMC keys. Any local low-privileged process can reach the root-privileged helper after installation, enabling unauthorized hardware-control operations with system-wide consequences.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2025-9815
- Published
- Sep 2, 2025
- Updated
- Sep 2, 2025
- Vendor
- alaneuler
- Product
- batteryKid
- Classifications
- CWE-306, CWE-287, T1548
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- authenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Sep 2, 2025CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Sep 2, 2025Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=2.0
- Affected versionversion=2.1
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- batteryKid XPC proof of conceptproof of concept · unverified
Labels summarize the accepted research assessment. They do not indicate a test against your environment.
Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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