Persistent firmware modification via unprotected boot chain
Published Dec 2, 2025 · Updated Dec 2, 2025
Insecure boot protection in Entrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi through 13.6.11 or 13.7 allows attackers to alter firmware. The Cosmo chassis management board leaves its ARM SoC boot chain without secure-boot enforcement, so JTAG access or a board firmware upgrade accepts persistently modified firmware. Physical access to the board is required; firmware control can influence appliance boot, tamper events, the front display, and USB state without compromising embedded HSM keys.
Summary
What happened
Insecure boot protection in Entrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi through 13.6.11 or 13.7 allows attackers to alter firmware. The Cosmo chassis management board leaves its ARM SoC boot chain without secure-boot enforcement, so JTAG access or a board firmware upgrade accepts persistently modified firmware. Physical access to the board is required; firmware control can influence appliance boot, tamper events, the front display, and USB state without compromising embedded HSM keys.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2025-59694
- Published
- Dec 2, 2025
- Updated
- Dec 2, 2025
- Vendor
- Unknown vendor
- Product
- Unknown product
- Classifications
- CWE-1274, T1542.001
- Attack vector
- physical
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Dec 2, 2025CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Dec 2, 2025Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Affected products and versions are unavailable in this record.
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Google Security Research nShield insecure-boot proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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