Signature malleability via missing scalar range constraints
Published Aug 22, 2025 · Updated Aug 22, 2025
Signature verification in Consensys gnark before 0.14.0 allows attackers to create distinct valid witnesses for one signature. The EdDSA and ECDSA Verify functions use S without constraining it to the scalar range, so S plus the curve order satisfies the same public inputs. Exploitation requires a protocol deriving nullifiers or replay protection from R and S; a forged witness can bypass those controls and enable double spending.
Summary
What happened
Signature verification in Consensys gnark before 0.14.0 allows attackers to create distinct valid witnesses for one signature. The EdDSA and ECDSA Verify functions use S without constraining it to the scalar range, so S plus the curve order satisfies the same public inputs. Exploitation requires a protocol deriving nullifiers or replay protection from R and S; a forged witness can bypass those controls and enable double spending.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2025-57801
- Published
- Aug 22, 2025
- Updated
- Aug 22, 2025
- Vendor
- Consensys
- Product
- gnark
- Classifications
- CWE-347
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Aug 22, 2025CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 22, 2025Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=< 0.14.0
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
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Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Maintainer signature-malleability demonstrationproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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