Command execution via shell-concatenated compiler arguments
Published Mar 3, 2026 · Updated Mar 3, 2026
Command injection in the szc compiler driver in Stabilizer allows local users to execute arbitrary commands via crafted compiler arguments. The arg helper and build stages concatenate output names, input filenames, and pass-through flags into shell command strings that os.system() executes without quoting or validation. Exploitation requires local access to invoke szc and control its arguments or build inputs; injected commands run with the privileges of the szc process.
Summary
What happened
Command injection in the szc compiler driver in Stabilizer allows local users to execute arbitrary commands via crafted compiler arguments. The arg helper and build stages concatenate output names, input filenames, and pass-through flags into shell command strings that os.system() executes without quoting or validation. Exploitation requires local access to invoke szc and control its arguments or build inputs; injected commands run with the privileges of the szc process.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2025-52365
- Published
- Mar 3, 2026
- Updated
- Mar 3, 2026
- Vendor
- Unknown vendor
- Product
- Unknown product
- Classifications
- CWE-77, T1059.004
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- authenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Mar 3, 2026CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Mar 3, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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What is affected?
Affected products and versions are unavailable in this record.
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- szc crafted-filename command-injection proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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