Malicious installer execution via weak signing and ASLR
Published Aug 4, 2025 · Updated Aug 5, 2025
Cryptographic weakness in CyberGhostVPNSetup.exe allows attackers to pass malicious installers off as signed software via forged SHA-1 chains. The Windows installer uses SHA-1 for code signing and omits High Entropy ASLR, leaving its signature susceptible to collision-based forgery and its load addresses predictable. Exploitation requires execution of a counterfeit installer on a Windows system without strict SmartScreen or trust-policy enforcement, granting malicious code the installation privileges available to that process.
Summary
What happened
Cryptographic weakness in CyberGhostVPNSetup.exe allows attackers to pass malicious installers off as signed software via forged SHA-1 chains. The Windows installer uses SHA-1 for code signing and omits High Entropy ASLR, leaving its signature susceptible to collision-based forgery and its load addresses predictable. Exploitation requires execution of a counterfeit installer on a Windows system without strict SmartScreen or trust-policy enforcement, granting malicious code the installation privileges available to that process.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2025-51726
- Published
- Aug 4, 2025
- Updated
- Aug 5, 2025
- Vendor
- Unknown vendor
- Product
- Unknown product
- Classifications
- CWE-327, T1553.002
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Aug 4, 2025CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 5, 2025Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Affected products and versions are unavailable in this record.
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Forged SHA-1 installer and predictable-ASLR demonstrationproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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