Unauthenticated account takeover via hard-coded JWT key
Published Dec 5, 2025 · Updated Aug 14, 2026
Hard-coded key use in Advantech WISE-DeviceOn Server before 5.4 allows remote attackers to impersonate any account with a forged JWT. AuthUtil builds the EIRMMToken HS512 signer and verifier from one static secret, then accepts the token when its email claim matches an account. Knowledge of a valid email is the only account-specific gate; impersonating the root super admin grants server control and command execution on managed agents.
Summary
What happened
Hard-coded key use in Advantech WISE-DeviceOn Server before 5.4 allows remote attackers to impersonate any account with a forged JWT. AuthUtil builds the EIRMMToken HS512 signer and verifier from one static secret, then accepts the token when its email claim matches an account. Knowledge of a valid email is the only account-specific gate; impersonating the root super admin grants server control and command execution on managed agents.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2025-34256
- Published
- Dec 5, 2025
- Updated
- Aug 14, 2026
- Vendor
- Advantech
- Product
- DeviceOn Server
- Classifications
- CWE-321, T1606.001
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Dec 5, 2025CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 14, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=0 <5.4.0
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Pellera EIRMMToken forgery demonstrationproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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