Tenant storage compromise via metadata-fetch DNS rebinding
Published May 8, 2025 · Updated Feb 26, 2026
Server-side request forgery in Microsoft Azure Storage Resource Provider allows remote authenticated users to spoof service requests. A DNS-rebinding sequence hijacks the service's identity-metadata fetch, causing it to follow an attacker-directed endpoint and expose Microsoft Entra ID tokens for arbitrary tenants. An Azure-authorized attacker can abuse a leaked token to move across tenants and regenerate SFTP passwords, compromising tenant storage.
Summary
What happened
Server-side request forgery in Microsoft Azure Storage Resource Provider allows remote authenticated users to spoof service requests. A DNS-rebinding sequence hijacks the service's identity-metadata fetch, causing it to follow an attacker-directed endpoint and expose Microsoft Entra ID tokens for arbitrary tenants. An Azure-authorized attacker can abuse a leaked token to move across tenants and regenerate SFTP passwords, compromising tenant storage.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2025-29972
- Published
- May 8, 2025
- Updated
- Feb 26, 2026
- Vendor
- Microsoft
- Product
- Azure Storage Resource Provider
- Classifications
- CWE-918, T1528
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- authenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- May 8, 2025CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Feb 26, 2026Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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- Affected versionversion=-
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Cloud-Wide Contamination Chaining SSRFs for Tenant Compromise in Azureproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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