Malicious-model bypass via extension-only archive scanning
Published Mar 3, 2025 · Updated Dec 29, 2025
Security scan bypass in picklescan 0.0.1 through 0.0.21 allows remote attackers to conceal malicious Pickle payloads in model archives. The ZIP archive scanner selected embedded files only when their suffix matched a fixed pickle-extension set, ignoring Pickle content under other names. Exploitation requires a recipient or automated process to trust and load a model that passed scanning, at which point the hidden payload executes.
Summary
What happened
Security scan bypass in picklescan 0.0.1 through 0.0.21 allows remote attackers to conceal malicious Pickle payloads in model archives. The ZIP archive scanner selected embedded files only when their suffix matched a fixed pickle-extension set, ignoring Pickle content under other names. Exploitation requires a recipient or automated process to trust and load a model that passed scanning, at which point the hidden payload executes.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2025-1889
- Published
- Mar 3, 2025
- Updated
- Dec 29, 2025
- Vendor
- Matthieu Maitre
- Product
- picklescan
- Classifications
- CWE-646, T1204.002
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Mar 3, 2025CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Dec 29, 2025Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
Compare your product and version with the public record. A matching version still requires validation against your environment.
Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=0.0.1 <=0.0.21
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Unexpected-extension PyTorch archive proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
Labels summarize the accepted research assessment. They do not indicate a test against your environment.
Technologies
Your stack
See the directory against your own environment.
Your stack
Check the software in your environment
Book a demo to see how Hinoki identifies affected software and validates exploitability in your environment.
Book a demo