Authenticated RCE via cloudpickle deserialization
Published Sep 25, 2025 · Updated Sep 25, 2025
Deserialization in SenseTime LazyLLM 0.6.0 and 0.6.1 allows remote authenticated users to execute commands through relay requests. The /_call route passes attacker-controlled base64 values to load_obj, which invokes cloudpickle.loads and instantiates objects with executable reduction methods. A reachable RelayServer service and low-privileged access are required; successful requests run commands with the service process's host permissions.
Summary
What happened
Deserialization in SenseTime LazyLLM 0.6.0 and 0.6.1 allows remote authenticated users to execute commands through relay requests. The /_call route passes attacker-controlled base64 values to load_obj, which invokes cloudpickle.loads and instantiates objects with executable reduction methods. A reachable RelayServer service and low-privileged access are required; successful requests run commands with the service process's host permissions.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2025-10965
- Published
- Sep 25, 2025
- Updated
- Sep 25, 2025
- Vendor
- SenseTime
- Product
- LazyLLM
- Classifications
- CWE-20, CWE-502, T1190
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- authenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Sep 25, 2025CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Sep 25, 2025Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=0.6.0
- Affected versionversion=0.6.1
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- RelayServer /_call cloudpickle command-execution PoCfunctional · demonstrated
Labels summarize the accepted research assessment. They do not indicate a test against your environment.
Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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