Local database disclosure and modification via hard-coded key
Published May 21, 2025 · Updated May 21, 2025
Hard-coded cryptographic key use in itech iLabClient 3.7.1 allows local users to read or alter the client's local laboratory database. iLabClient.jar embeds the Apache Derby bootPassword used to encrypt the iLabClient and iLabDB databases, allowing the same key to open both stores. Local filesystem access to the installation and database files is sufficient to decrypt records and modify stored users, including adding an administrative account.
Summary
What happened
Hard-coded cryptographic key use in itech iLabClient 3.7.1 allows local users to read or alter the client's local laboratory database. iLabClient.jar embeds the Apache Derby bootPassword used to encrypt the iLabClient and iLabDB databases, allowing the same key to open both stores. Local filesystem access to the installation and database files is sufficient to decrypt records and modify stored users, including adding an administrative account.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2024-56429
- Published
- May 21, 2025
- Updated
- May 21, 2025
- Vendor
- itech Laborlösungen GmbH
- Product
- iLabClient
- Classifications
- CWE-321, T1552.001
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- May 21, 2025CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- May 21, 2025Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=3.7.1
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- iLabClient database boot-password proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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