Unauthorized device binding via exposed API route
Published Oct 24, 2024 · Updated Oct 24, 2024
Incorrect authorization in Cloud Smart Lock 2.0.1 allows remote authenticated users to bind other physical devices through its API. The APK exposes the base URL in NetworkConstant and the binding path in OperatorApi, while the server accepts a guessed sn value with a valid account token. A registered application account is required; successful binding exposes the other lock's information and controls to the attacker's account.
Summary
What happened
Incorrect authorization in Cloud Smart Lock 2.0.1 allows remote authenticated users to bind other physical devices through its API. The APK exposes the base URL in NetworkConstant and the binding path in OperatorApi, while the server accepts a guessed sn value with a valid account token. A registered application account is required; successful binding exposes the other lock's information and controls to the attacker's account.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2024-48548
- Published
- Oct 24, 2024
- Updated
- Oct 24, 2024
- Vendor
- Shenzhen Seamooncloud Technology Co., Ltd.
- Product
- Cloud Smart Lock Firmware
- Classifications
- CWE-863, T1190
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- authenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Oct 24, 2024CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Oct 24, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
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- Affected versionversion=2.0.1
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
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Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
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Public exploit references
- Cloud Smart Lock device-binding reproductionproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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