Physical USB policy bypass via mismatched device matching
Published Jun 15, 2024 · Updated Nov 12, 2024
Authorization bypass in GNOME Settings Daemon through 46.0 allows physically proximate attackers to access unintended Linux USB functionality. The USB protection manager authorizes devices advertising only HID or hub classes, while the kernel can bind drivers by attacker-controlled vendor and product IDs. Physical insertion of a crafted device into a GNOME Linux host with USBGuard protection enables otherwise blocked drivers, including mass-storage and device-specific kernel modules.
Summary
What happened
Authorization bypass in GNOME Settings Daemon through 46.0 allows physically proximate attackers to access unintended Linux USB functionality. The USB protection manager authorizes devices advertising only HID or hub classes, while the kernel can bind drivers by attacker-controlled vendor and product IDs. Physical insertion of a crafted device into a GNOME Linux host with USBGuard protection enables otherwise blocked drivers, including mass-storage and device-specific kernel modules.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2024-38394
- Published
- Jun 15, 2024
- Updated
- Nov 12, 2024
- Vendor
- Unknown vendor
- Product
- Unknown product
- Classifications
- T1200
- Attack vector
- physical
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Jun 15, 2024CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Nov 12, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Affected products and versions are unavailable in this record.
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- USBGuard bypass proof of conceptfunctional · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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