Registry disruption and model poisoning via encoded names
Published Jun 6, 2024 · Updated Aug 1, 2024
Model-name validation failure in MLflow before 2.11.3 allows remote authenticated users to poison registry data via URL encoding. The Model Registry creation path does not canonicalize encoded names before enforcing uniqueness, so encoded and decoded forms create distinct records that resolve ambiguously. Model-creation access is required; resulting collisions can redirect later model selection to attacker-controlled data or interrupt access to the intended model.
Summary
What happened
Model-name validation failure in MLflow before 2.11.3 allows remote authenticated users to poison registry data via URL encoding. The Model Registry creation path does not canonicalize encoded names before enforcing uniqueness, so encoded and decoded forms create distinct records that resolve ambiguously. Model-creation access is required; resulting collisions can redirect later model selection to attacker-controlled data or interrupt access to the intended model.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2024-3099
- Published
- Jun 6, 2024
- Updated
- Aug 1, 2024
- Vendor
- MLflow Project
- Product
- MLflow
- Classifications
- CWE-475, T1565.001
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- authenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Jun 6, 2024CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 1, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=2.11.1
- Affected versionversion=unspecified <=latest
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Model-name URL-encoding proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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