Encrypted-data compromise via cloned RNG state
Published Oct 2, 2024 · Updated Oct 2, 2024
Nonce reuse in Alexandr Fadeev Cocoon before 0.4.0 allows local users to compromise confidentiality and integrity via repeated encryption. The encrypt, wrap, and dump methods clone the internal StdRng, resetting its state and generating the same nonce for sequential calls. Exploitation requires reuse of one custom-seeded or custom-RNG object; Cocoon::new uses ThreadRng and is not affected.
Summary
What happened
Nonce reuse in Alexandr Fadeev Cocoon before 0.4.0 allows local users to compromise confidentiality and integrity via repeated encryption. The encrypt, wrap, and dump methods clone the internal StdRng, resetting its state and generating the same nonce for sequential calls. Exploitation requires reuse of one custom-seeded or custom-RNG object; Cocoon::new uses ThreadRng and is not affected.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2024-21530
- Published
- Oct 2, 2024
- Updated
- Oct 2, 2024
- Vendor
- The Apache Software Foundation
- Product
- Apache Cocoon
- Classifications
- CWE-323
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Oct 2, 2024CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Oct 2, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=0 <0.4.0
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- RustSec sequential-encryption reproducerproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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