Identity-check bypass via JWE acceptance in decode
Published Dec 25, 2023 · Updated Aug 26, 2024
Cryptographic verification confusion in Nov Matake json-jwt 1.16.3 allows attackers to bypass identity checks with a forged JWE. JSON::JWT.decode accepts both signed JWS and encrypted JWE tokens, allowing a public signing key to create an attacker-controlled JWE that decode treats as valid. Exploitation requires an application to use the same decode path for authentication and expose its JWS public key; accepted tokens assume another identity.
Summary
What happened
Cryptographic verification confusion in Nov Matake json-jwt 1.16.3 allows attackers to bypass identity checks with a forged JWE. JSON::JWT.decode accepts both signed JWS and encrypted JWE tokens, allowing a public signing key to create an attacker-controlled JWE that decode treats as valid. Exploitation requires an application to use the same decode path for authentication and expose its JWS public key; accepted tokens assume another identity.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2023-51774
- Published
- Dec 25, 2023
- Updated
- Aug 26, 2024
- Vendor
- Nov Matake
- Product
- json-jwt
- Classifications
- CWE-284
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Dec 25, 2023CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 26, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=1.16.3
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
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Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
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Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Security susceptible to sign/encrypt confusion attacksproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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