Memory corruption via freed Connection-header value reuse
Published May 1, 2024 · Updated Nov 4, 2025
Use-after-free in Tinyproxy 1.10.0 and 1.11.1 allows remote attackers to corrupt memory via a crafted HTTP Connection header. The remove_connection_headers() function removes a header named by the Connection value from its ordered map, frees that value, and then continues parsing through the dangling pointer. Network access is sufficient when no ACL or BasicAuth restriction blocks the client; a regular build demonstrably crashes, while code execution remains unproven.
Summary
What happened
Use-after-free in Tinyproxy 1.10.0 and 1.11.1 allows remote attackers to corrupt memory via a crafted HTTP Connection header. The remove_connection_headers() function removes a header named by the Connection value from its ordered map, frees that value, and then continues parsing through the dangling pointer. Network access is sufficient when no ACL or BasicAuth restriction blocks the client; a regular build demonstrably crashes, while code execution remains unproven.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2023-49606
- Published
- May 1, 2024
- Updated
- Nov 4, 2025
- Vendor
- Tinyproxy
- Product
- Tinyproxy
- Classifications
- CWE-416, T1190
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- May 1, 2024CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Nov 4, 2025Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=1.10.0
- Affected versionversion=1.11.1
- Affected versionversion=Tinyproxy 1.10.0
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Public exploit references
- Cisco Talos crafted HTTP request proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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