Root shell access via exposed UART boot menu
Published Jan 17, 2024 · Updated Aug 2, 2024
Insecure UART access in TP-Link Tapo TC70 and C200 V3 firmware 1.3.4 allows physically proximate attackers to obtain a root shell. The bootloader accepts an interrupt over exposed UART pins and permits boot arguments to be changed so the camera starts /bin/sh as root. Exploitation requires opening the camera, soldering to its circuit-board UART pins, and rebooting it; the resulting shell can read and dump the complete filesystem.
Summary
What happened
Insecure UART access in TP-Link Tapo TC70 and C200 V3 firmware 1.3.4 allows physically proximate attackers to obtain a root shell. The bootloader accepts an interrupt over exposed UART pins and permits boot arguments to be changed so the camera starts /bin/sh as root. Exploitation requires opening the camera, soldering to its circuit-board UART pins, and rebooting it; the resulting shell can read and dump the complete filesystem.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2023-49515
- Published
- Jan 17, 2024
- Updated
- Aug 2, 2024
- Vendor
- TP-Link
- Product
- Tapo TC70 Firmware
- Classifications
- CWE-922, T1068
- Attack vector
- physical
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Jan 17, 2024CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 2, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=1.3.4
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- TAPO TC70 and C200 unauthorized root access using UARTproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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