Code execution via overflowing comment-pointer allocation
Published May 1, 2024 · Updated Nov 4, 2025
Heap-based buffer overflow in STB stb_vorbis 1.22 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code by supplying a crafted Ogg Vorbis file. The start_decoder function multiplies an attacker-controlled comment count by the pointer size without checking for integer overflow, underallocating comment_list before writing pointers past its heap buffer. Exploitation requires a host application to decode the malicious file; successful heap grooming permits arbitrary code execution in that application's context.
Summary
What happened
Heap-based buffer overflow in STB stb_vorbis 1.22 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code by supplying a crafted Ogg Vorbis file. The start_decoder function multiplies an attacker-controlled comment count by the pointer size without checking for integer overflow, underallocating comment_list before writing pointers past its heap buffer. Exploitation requires a host application to decode the malicious file; successful heap grooming permits arbitrary code execution in that application's context.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2023-47212
- Published
- May 1, 2024
- Updated
- Nov 4, 2025
- Vendor
- STB
- Product
- stb_vorbis
- Classifications
- CWE-787, CWE-190, T1203
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- May 1, 2024CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Nov 4, 2025Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=1.22
- Affected versionversion=v1.22
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Cisco Talos technical reproducerproof of concept · demonstrated
Labels summarize the accepted research assessment. They do not indicate a test against your environment.
Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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