Smart-contract logic corruption via misordered default arguments
Published May 11, 2023 · Updated Jan 24, 2025
Incorrect argument ordering in Vyper before 0.3.8 allows attackers to trigger unintended smart-contract behavior after compilation. The lookup_internal_function alignment routine takes default values from the start of the list, so partially supplied calls receive leftmost rather than remaining rightmost defaults and can bypass type checking. Affected source must define an internal function with multiple defaults and omit some arguments; the compiled contract can then consume an unintended value.
Summary
What happened
Incorrect argument ordering in Vyper before 0.3.8 allows attackers to trigger unintended smart-contract behavior after compilation. The lookup_internal_function alignment routine takes default values from the start of the list, so partially supplied calls receive leftmost rather than remaining rightmost defaults and can bypass type checking. Affected source must define an internal function with multiple defaults and omit some arguments; the compiled contract can then consume an unintended value.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2023-32059
- Published
- May 11, 2023
- Updated
- Jan 24, 2025
- Vendor
- Vyper
- Product
- Vyper
- Classifications
- CWE-683
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- May 11, 2023CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Jan 24, 2025Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
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- Affected versionversion=< 0.3.8
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Upstream internal-call default-argument demonstrationproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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