Configuration tampering via writable shared client directory
Published Dec 9, 2023 · Updated Aug 2, 2024
Incorrect default permissions in NCP Secure Enterprise Client before 12.22 allow local users to alter security-sensitive configuration files. The C:\ProgramData\NCP\SecureClient tree grants low-privileged accounts write access to certificate and configuration resources consumed by the client and a privileged service. That access permits trusted-CA insertion, coerced SMB authentication through branding paths, and redirection of privileged log output.
Summary
What happened
Incorrect default permissions in NCP Secure Enterprise Client before 12.22 allow local users to alter security-sensitive configuration files. The C:\ProgramData\NCP\SecureClient tree grants low-privileged accounts write access to certificate and configuration resources consumed by the client and a privileged service. That access permits trusted-CA insertion, coerced SMB authentication through branding paths, and redirection of privileged log output.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2023-28870
- Published
- Dec 9, 2023
- Updated
- Aug 2, 2024
- Vendor
- Unknown vendor
- Product
- Unknown product
- Classifications
- CWE-276, T1187
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- authenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Dec 9, 2023CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 2, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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What is affected?
Affected products and versions are unavailable in this record.
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Public exploit references
- usd HeroLab configuration-permission proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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