Authentication bypass via trusted client-supplied path header
Published Apr 4, 2023 · Updated Feb 11, 2025
Improper input validation in affected Envoy releases allows remote attackers to bypass JWT checks using a forged original-path header. Envoy fails to remove the client-supplied x-envoy-original-path header before request processing, so the JWT filter and logs trust its value instead of the actual request path. Authentication bypass requires the jwt_authn filter, while other deployments can record or forward a falsified path.
Summary
What happened
Improper input validation in affected Envoy releases allows remote attackers to bypass JWT checks using a forged original-path header. Envoy fails to remove the client-supplied x-envoy-original-path header before request processing, so the JWT filter and logs trust its value instead of the actual request path. Authentication bypass requires the jwt_authn filter, while other deployments can record or forward a falsified path.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2023-27487
- Published
- Apr 4, 2023
- Updated
- Feb 11, 2025
- Vendor
- Envoy Proxy
- Product
- Envoy
- Classifications
- CWE-20, T1190
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Apr 4, 2023CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Feb 11, 2025Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=< 1.22.9
- Affected versionversion=>= 1.23.0, < 1.23.6
- Affected versionversion=>= 1.24.0, < 1.24.4
- Affected versionversion=>= 1.25.0, <1.25.3
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Public exploit references
- Forged x-envoy-original-path curl demonstrationproof of concept · demonstrated
Labels summarize the accepted research assessment. They do not indicate a test against your environment.
Technologies
Your stack
See the directory against your own environment.
Your stack
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