Physical root access via mutable UART boot parameters
Published Jan 23, 2023 · Updated Apr 3, 2025
Missing authorization in TP-Link Tapo C200 V1 allows physically proximate attackers to obtain a root shell through its UART interface. The exposed bootloader accepts an interrupted autoboot sequence and permits the init environment value to be changed to /bin/sh before bootcmd runs. Physical access to the camera and knowledge of the autoboot interruption key are required; the resulting root shell permits firmware extraction and arbitrary command execution.
Summary
What happened
Missing authorization in TP-Link Tapo C200 V1 allows physically proximate attackers to obtain a root shell through its UART interface. The exposed bootloader accepts an interrupted autoboot sequence and permits the init environment value to be changed to /bin/sh before bootcmd runs. Physical access to the camera and knowledge of the autoboot interruption key are required; the resulting root shell permits firmware extraction and arbitrary command execution.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2022-41505
- Published
- Jan 23, 2023
- Updated
- Apr 3, 2025
- Vendor
- Unknown vendor
- Product
- Unknown product
- Classifications
- CWE-862, T1200, T1068
- Attack vector
- physical
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Jan 23, 2023CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Apr 3, 2025Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Affected products and versions are unavailable in this record.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Tapo C200 V1 UART root-shell procedurefunctional · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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