Privacy-control bypass via injected Objective-C selectors
Published Sep 20, 2022 · Updated Aug 3, 2024
Improper input validation in Apple Contacts before iOS 15.7 and macOS Big Sur 11.7 allows local users to bypass privacy controls. CNContactPickerViewController accepts predicateForEnablingContact with a custom selector, enabling injected Objective-C calls in an internal service. A malicious local app can exploit this path without Contacts permission to read protected contact data or send it through attacker-chosen HTTP requests.
Summary
What happened
Improper input validation in Apple Contacts before iOS 15.7 and macOS Big Sur 11.7 allows local users to bypass privacy controls. CNContactPickerViewController accepts predicateForEnablingContact with a custom selector, enabling injected Objective-C calls in an internal service. A malicious local app can exploit this path without Contacts permission to read protected contact data or send it through attacker-chosen HTTP requests.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2022-32854
- Published
- Sep 20, 2022
- Updated
- Aug 3, 2024
- Vendor
- Apple
- Product
- iOS
- Classifications
- CWE-20, T1005
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- authenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Sep 20, 2022CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 3, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=unspecified <16
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Public exploit references
- Conditional HTTP Requests proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
- Control Program Flow proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
Labels summarize the accepted research assessment. They do not indicate a test against your environment.
Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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