Unauthenticated access-control bypass via suffix-confused route matching
Published May 21, 2022 · Updated Aug 3, 2024
Improper access control in the Beego HTTP router before 1.12.9 and 2.x before 2.0.3 allows remote attackers to reach protected routes. Tree.match strips an allowed .xml, .json, or .html suffix from a fixed path segment and descends into a child router even while unmatched path text remains. Exploitation requires a parameterized descendant route with access control applied to its exact prefix; a crafted path reaches the protected handler without authentication.
Summary
What happened
Improper access control in the Beego HTTP router before 1.12.9 and 2.x before 2.0.3 allows remote attackers to reach protected routes. Tree.match strips an allowed .xml, .json, or .html suffix from a fixed path segment and descends into a child router even while unmatched path text remains. Exploitation requires a parameterized descendant route with access control applied to its exact prefix; a crafted path reaches the protected handler without authentication.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2022-31259
- Published
- May 21, 2022
- Updated
- Aug 3, 2024
- Vendor
- Unknown vendor
- Product
- Unknown product
- Classifications
- CWE-284, T1190
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- May 21, 2022CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 3, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
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What is affected?
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Published CVSS scores
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Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
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Public exploit references
- Crafted .xml route-match demonstrationproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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