Local root-context socket connections via namespace-controlled path
Published Jun 3, 2024 · Updated Mar 27, 2025
Improper input validation in Canonical Apport before 2.21.0 allows local users to make root connect to arbitrary Unix sockets. When forwarding container crashes, the handler trusts /proc//root/run/apport.socket even though user and mount namespaces let the crashing user control that path and redirect it with a symlink. Exploitation requires a local account able to create user and mount namespaces and can route root-originated crash data to a chosen service, expose protected dumps, or trigger privileged processes.
Summary
What happened
Improper input validation in Canonical Apport before 2.21.0 allows local users to make root connect to arbitrary Unix sockets. When forwarding container crashes, the handler trusts /proc//root/run/apport.socket even though user and mount namespaces let the crashing user control that path and redirect it with a symlink. Exploitation requires a local account able to create user and mount namespaces and can route root-originated crash data to a chosen service, expose protected dumps, or trigger privileged processes.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2022-1242
- Published
- Jun 3, 2024
- Updated
- Mar 27, 2025
- Vendor
- Canonical
- Product
- Apport
- Classifications
- CWE-20, T1068
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- authenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Jun 3, 2024CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Mar 27, 2025Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=0 <2.21.0
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Per-process Apport socket namespace proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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