Root command execution via unchecked D-Bus script argument
Published Mar 22, 2022 · Updated Aug 4, 2024
Incorrect access control in GlobalProtect-openconnect before 1.4.3 allows local users to execute arbitrary commands as root via D-Bus. GPService accepts an attacker-controlled --script argument through com.yuezk.qt.GPService and passes it to the privileged OpenConnect process without authorization. A local account and access to any VPN service are sufficient; D-Bus activation exposes GPService even when its systemd unit is stopped, resulting in root code execution.
Summary
What happened
Incorrect access control in GlobalProtect-openconnect before 1.4.3 allows local users to execute arbitrary commands as root via D-Bus. GPService accepts an attacker-controlled --script argument through com.yuezk.qt.GPService and passes it to the privileged OpenConnect process without authorization. A local account and access to any VPN service are sufficient; D-Bus activation exposes GPService even when its systemd unit is stopped, resulting in root code execution.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2021-45809
- Published
- Mar 22, 2022
- Updated
- Aug 4, 2024
- Vendor
- Unknown vendor
- Product
- Unknown product
- Classifications
- T1068
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- Unavailable
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Mar 22, 2022CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 4, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Affected products and versions are unavailable in this record.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- GPService --script root-command proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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