Lock takeover via cleartext BLE pairing code
Published Dec 2, 2021 · Updated Aug 4, 2024
Cleartext pairing-code transmission in the eGeeTouch Android travel-padlock app allows physically proximate attackers to control the lock over BLE. The companion app writes an authentication command containing the secret pairing code in cleartext to BLE attribute 0xfff8, exposing the credential to traffic capture. Exploitation requires the same companion app, capture of nearby BLE traffic, and physical access to press the lock's power button; the attacker can then change the pairing password and lock out the owner.
Summary
What happened
Cleartext pairing-code transmission in the eGeeTouch Android travel-padlock app allows physically proximate attackers to control the lock over BLE. The companion app writes an authentication command containing the secret pairing code in cleartext to BLE attribute 0xfff8, exposing the credential to traffic capture. Exploitation requires the same companion app, capture of nearby BLE traffic, and physical access to press the lock's power button; the attacker can then change the pairing password and lock out the owner.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2021-44518
- Published
- Dec 2, 2021
- Updated
- Aug 4, 2024
- Vendor
- Unknown vendor
- Product
- Unknown product
- Classifications
- CWE-319, T1040
- Attack vector
- adjacent
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Dec 2, 2021CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 4, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Affected products and versions are unavailable in this record.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- The eGeeTouch TSA Smart Lock is Anything Butfunctional · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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