Unauthenticated firmware replacement via factory debug service
Published Jan 28, 2022 · Updated Apr 15, 2025
Firmware update flaw in the factory binary in Reolink RLC-410W 3.0.0.136_20121102 allows remote attackers to replace firmware. The wait_for_connection function trusts a four-byte UDP marker on port 2009, records the sender address, and connects back on port 9123 without authentication. Any network host that can reach the listener can submit firmware that is installed after only a CRC check, enabling persistent control of camera operation.
Summary
What happened
Firmware update flaw in the factory binary in Reolink RLC-410W 3.0.0.136_20121102 allows remote attackers to replace firmware. The wait_for_connection function trusts a four-byte UDP marker on port 2009, records the sender address, and connects back on port 9123 without authentication. Any network host that can reach the listener can submit firmware that is installed after only a CRC check, enabling persistent control of camera operation.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2021-40419
- Published
- Jan 28, 2022
- Updated
- Apr 15, 2025
- Vendor
- Unknown vendor
- Product
- Unknown product
- Classifications
- CWE-489, T1495
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Jan 28, 2022CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Apr 15, 2025Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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What is affected?
Affected products and versions are unavailable in this record.
Published CVSS scores
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Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Public exploit references
- Cisco Talos factory-service request sequenceproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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