Local root escalation via predictable temporary paths
Published May 27, 2021 · Updated Aug 3, 2024
Symlink following in pleaseedit in pleaser before 0.4 allows local users to gain root privileges through predictable temporary files. The tmp_edit_file_name and source_tmp_file_name paths are predictable, and privileged openat calls omit O_NOFOLLOW before chown or overwrite operations. Exploitation requires pleaseedit authorization and either winning a race where kernel symlink protections do not block it or controlling the target directory with a cooperating account.
Summary
What happened
Symlink following in pleaseedit in pleaser before 0.4 allows local users to gain root privileges through predictable temporary files. The tmp_edit_file_name and source_tmp_file_name paths are predictable, and privileged openat calls omit O_NOFOLLOW before chown or overwrite operations. Exploitation requires pleaseedit authorization and either winning a race where kernel symlink protections do not block it or controlling the target directory with a cooperating account.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2021-31154
- Published
- May 27, 2021
- Updated
- Aug 3, 2024
- Vendor
- Unknown vendor
- Product
- Unknown product
- Classifications
- CWE-340, CWE-59, T1068
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- authenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- May 27, 2021CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 3, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Affected products and versions are unavailable in this record.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- pleaseedit symlink attack demonstrationproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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