Memory disclosure and crash via request-length wraparound
Published Feb 4, 2020 · Updated Aug 4, 2024
Out-of-bounds read in Mini-SNMPD 1.4 allows remote attackers to disclose process memory or crash the daemon via a crafted SNMP request. The decode_int request-ID parser subtracts an attacker-controlled BER integer length from the packet size, allowing size_t wraparound to bypass its bounds check. An unauthenticated network request is sufficient; repeated requests disclose memory four bytes at a time, while malformed parsing can terminate the service.
Summary
What happened
Out-of-bounds read in Mini-SNMPD 1.4 allows remote attackers to disclose process memory or crash the daemon via a crafted SNMP request. The decode_int request-ID parser subtracts an attacker-controlled BER integer length from the packet size, allowing size_t wraparound to bypass its bounds check. An unauthenticated network request is sufficient; repeated requests disclose memory four bytes at a time, while malformed parsing can terminate the service.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2020-6059
- Published
- Feb 4, 2020
- Updated
- Aug 4, 2024
- Vendor
- Troglobit
- Product
- Mini-SNMPD
- Classifications
- CWE-190, CAPEC-92, T1190
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Feb 4, 2020CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 4, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=Mini-SNMPD 1.4
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Cisco Talos decode_int proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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