Local code execution via unescaped upgrade filename
Published Feb 18, 2021 · Updated Aug 4, 2024
Command injection in dji_sys in DJI Mavic 2 Remote Controller firmware before 01.00.0510 allows local users to execute code via USB. The upgrade handler embeds an uploaded signature filename within a dji_verify shell command passed to popen, allowing an apostrophe to escape its quoting and inject shell syntax. The attacker must connect over USB and deliver a crafted firmware archive, after which successful injection executes arbitrary commands on the embedded controller.
Summary
What happened
Command injection in dji_sys in DJI Mavic 2 Remote Controller firmware before 01.00.0510 allows local users to execute code via USB. The upgrade handler embeds an uploaded signature filename within a dji_verify shell command passed to popen, allowing an apostrophe to escape its quoting and inject shell syntax. The attacker must connect over USB and deliver a crafted firmware archive, after which successful injection executes arbitrary commands on the embedded controller.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2020-29664
- Published
- Feb 18, 2021
- Updated
- Aug 4, 2024
- Vendor
- Unknown vendor
- Product
- Unknown product
- Classifications
- CWE-78, T1059.004
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- Unavailable
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Feb 18, 2021CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 4, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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What is affected?
Affected products and versions are unavailable in this record.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Malicious firmware filename proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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