Cross-guest compromise via writable shared VM image
Published May 19, 2020 · Updated Sep 16, 2024
Improper image isolation in Kata Containers before 1.11.0 allows guest OS users to compromise subsequent guest VMs. Cloud Hypervisor attaches the root filesystem device read-write, so guest changes propagate into the host's shared .img file. Control of a guest is required; altering the default image controls later guests across VMMs and can expose the host to guest-at-boot attacks.
Summary
What happened
Improper image isolation in Kata Containers before 1.11.0 allows guest OS users to compromise subsequent guest VMs. Cloud Hypervisor attaches the root filesystem device read-write, so guest changes propagate into the host's shared .img file. Control of a guest is required; altering the default image controls later guests across VMMs and can expose the host to guest-at-boot attacks.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2020-2025
- Published
- May 19, 2020
- Updated
- Sep 16, 2024
- Vendor
- Kata Containers
- Product
- Kata Containers
- Classifications
- T1611
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- authenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- May 19, 2020CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Sep 16, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=unspecified <1.11.0
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- Kata Containers Cloud Hypervisor reproduction procedureproof of concept · demonstrated
Labels summarize the accepted research assessment. They do not indicate a test against your environment.
Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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