Signature-policy bypass via noncanonical ASN.1 encoding
Published Jun 22, 2020 · Updated Aug 4, 2024
Improper ECDSA signature verification in jsrsasign 4.0.0 through 8.0.18 allows remote attackers to bypass canonical-signature checks. The ECDSA verifier's ASN.1 DER parser accepts overlong sequence lengths, redundant zero bytes in INTEGER values, and trailing zero bytes, causing altered encodings of valid signatures to verify. Impact requires an application that validates ASN.1-encoded ECDSA signatures and depends on a single canonical signature; raw R-and-S concatenations are unaffected.
Summary
What happened
Improper ECDSA signature verification in jsrsasign 4.0.0 through 8.0.18 allows remote attackers to bypass canonical-signature checks. The ECDSA verifier's ASN.1 DER parser accepts overlong sequence lengths, redundant zero bytes in INTEGER values, and trailing zero bytes, causing altered encodings of valid signatures to verify. Impact requires an application that validates ASN.1-encoded ECDSA signatures and depends on a single canonical signature; raw R-and-S concatenations are unaffected.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2020-14966
- Published
- Jun 22, 2020
- Updated
- Aug 4, 2024
- Vendor
- Unknown vendor
- Product
- Unknown product
- Classifications
- CWE-347, T1553
- Attack vector
- network
- Privileges
- unauthenticated
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Jun 22, 2020CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 4, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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What is affected?
Affected products and versions are unavailable in this record.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- ECDSA ASN.1 malleability proof of conceptproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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