Host process hang via guest-controlled TRB loop
Published Aug 17, 2022 · Updated Aug 4, 2024
An infinite loop in QEMU 6.1.50 xHCI emulation allows privileged guest OS users to hang the host QEMU process via crafted TRBs. The xhci_ring_chain_length() function in hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c keeps fetching empty TRBs while its exit conditions depend entirely on guest-controlled values. Exploitation requires control inside a guest with an emulated xHCI device and interrupts that guest's QEMU process without reported data access or modification.
Summary
What happened
An infinite loop in QEMU 6.1.50 xHCI emulation allows privileged guest OS users to hang the host QEMU process via crafted TRBs. The xhci_ring_chain_length() function in hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c keeps fetching empty TRBs while its exit conditions depend entirely on guest-controlled values. Exploitation requires control inside a guest with an emulated xHCI device and interrupts that guest's QEMU process without reported data access or modification.
The record
- CVE
- CVE-2020-14394
- Published
- Aug 17, 2022
- Updated
- Aug 4, 2024
- Vendor
- QEMU Project
- Product
- QEMU
- Classifications
- CWE-835, T1499.004
- Attack vector
- local
- Privileges
- admin
Timeline
How it unfolded
- Aug 17, 2022CVE publishedPublication date reported by the CVE source.
- Aug 4, 2024Record updatedLatest update available in the CVE record.
Exploitability
Present is not the same as exploitable
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Is a vulnerable build present?
Compare these published version ranges with your installed build and any vendor patches.
- Affected versionversion=QEMU 6.1.50
What conditions does exploitation require?
What is affected?
Published CVSS scores
CVSS describes severity. EPSS estimates exploitation probability.
Attacks
What attackers are doing with it
Daily unique IPs observed by Shadowserver honeypots for known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Missing observations do not establish an absence of attacks.
Weakness, pattern, technique
Public exploit references
- QEMU xHCI guest kernel-module reproducerproof of concept · demonstrated
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Technologies
Your stack
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Your stack
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